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Records of everyday autobiographical events were gathered from a small group of adults 
during a 4-month period. This was followed by five memory tests extending over 2% years. 
Recognition memory, temporal ordering, and dating accuracy declined as the events tested 
became more remote. Recognition accuracy on original items was high over the entire study; 
whereas the false recognition of nonevent, foil items increased after a I- to 3-month delay. 
Confidence ratings of recognition accuracy remained consistently high over all tests, even 
though recognition accuracy deteriorated. Additional analyses of foil items indicated that 
false recognitions of nonevents as one’s own memories were related positively to the se- 
mantic similarity between foils and the original records from which they were constructed. 
Taken together, the data support the hypothesis that the same autobiographical schemata 
account for the correct recognition of actual events, the false recognition of certain non- 
events as one’s own memories, the correct rejection of other nonevents, and an overconfi- 
dence in the “facts” of one’s life. Cj 19X6 Academic Pre\,. Inc. 
The importance of autobiographical rec- 
ollections has long been acknowledged 
(Freud, 1905/1953, 191411960; Galton, 1879, 
1911; Hall, 1899; Henri & Henri, 1895, 
1898). Only recently, however, have psy- 
chologists attempted systematic studies of 
these memories (e.g., Bahrick, Bahrick, & 
Wittlinger, 1975; Fitzgerald, 1980; Linton, 
1975, 1979; Robinson, 1976; Warrington & 
Sanders, 1971). Much of this interest stems 
from concerns regarding clinical phe- 
nomena like childhood amnesia (e.g., 
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White & Pillemer, 1979), or the concor- 
dance between self-schemata and the pro- 
cessing of self-referenced information (e.g., 
Kuiper & Derry, 1980; Markus, 1977: 
Rogers, 1980). 
A variety of differing methods have been 
used to study autobiographical memory 
(e.g., Crovitz & Cordoni, 1982; Herrmann 
& Neisser, 1978; Linton, 1975; Rubin, 
1982). Two somewhat contradictory themes 
emerge from this work. The first claims that 
people often forget or confuse everyday 
happenings, especially if similar episodes 
are encountered frequently. The second 
claims that autobiographical events seem to 
remain vivid for years; in particular, those 
events associated with strong affective cues 
(e.g., flashbulb memories, Brown & Kulik. 
1977; Neisser, 1982; Winograd & Killinger, 
1983). These claims are difficult to assess 
and the contradictions difficult to resolve 
because valid records of the “remem- 
bered” events themselves were usually un- 
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available to verify the accuracy of reported 
memories (exceptions include Gold & 
Neisser, 1980; Linton, 1975; Thompson, 
1982). The general accuracy of autobio- 
graphical memories is thus unclear. 
An influential study in which accurate 
records of daily events were available is 
that of Linton (1975). In a 6-year longitu- 
dinal investigation, Linton recorded from 
two to five events daily, rated each event 
on dimensions thought relevant to its 
memorability (e.g., emotionality and data- 
bility), and at the end of each month, tested 
her capacity to recognize, sequence, and 
date records selected randomly from pre- 
vious months. Linton found that every- 
day, episodic events were not forgotten 
quickly-she recognized events as her own 
after lengthy delays. Since her results are 
based on verifiable earlier events, they are 
striking because forgetting seemed even 
less than suggested by previous research 
where the subjects’ accuracy could not be 
independently checked. In addition, her 
findings suggested that the perceived affec- 
tive qualities associated with some epi- 
sodes were not consistently good predic- 
tors of memory. Of the events remembered, 
most were not associated with strong affec- 
tive cues; and, conversely, some episodes 
rated high in emotionality were forgotten. 
In interpreting Linton’s results con- 
cerning recognition accuracy, it is impor- 
tant to note that the main focus of her work 
was on determining whether she could re- 
member when some event occurred, not in 
deciding if an episode in fact happened. Our 
concern is primarily recognition memory 
accuracy. In this regard, it is informative to 
consider that Linton served not only as the 
observer of events in her study and there- 
fore the subject, but also as her own ex- 
aminer. Because of this, it was not plausible 
to present herself with “false memories” 
for recognition. Her recognition test thus 
involved judging actual events as remem- 
bered or not. A more typical and sensitive 
test of recognition memory requires two 
types of items: actual and foil events. In 
this case, foils would be constructed rec- 
ords of nonevents-episodes that never 
happened. 
Foils are needed to separate memory sen- 
sitivity from response bias since recogni- 
tion judgments have been found to depend 
on these two related psychological pro- 
cesses (Banks, 1970; Green & Swets, 1966). 
Further, recognition decisions depend 
partly on the person’s subjective familiarity 
with the test items (Mandler, 1980). 
Knowing that many (if not all as in Linton’s 
case) of the items on a recognition test are 
taken from one’s own records likely creates 
a bias toward a lenient response criterion, 
thereby leading to an overestimate of 
memory accuracy and increasing the prob- 
ability of identifying foil items as true 
events (cf. Locksley, Stangor, Hepburn, 
Grosovsky, & Hochstrasser, 1984). From 
this perspective, memory accuracy can 
only be assessed by looking jointly at the 
relative differences in recognition perfor- 
mance for actual events and the false rec- 
ognition of foils. The use of foil items also 
provides a method for determining which 
features of events are related to improved 
memory or heightened confusedness by ex- 
amining false recognitions of specifically 
constructed nonevents. Thus, our aims 
were to chart the fate of everyday memo- 
ries over long time periods with special em- 
phasis on accuracy as assessed by com- 




Four consecutive l-month data collection 
periods (February-May 1981) were fol- 
lowed by five recognition, ordering, and 
dating tests. The first four tests were given 
in mid-June, September, and December 
1981, and February 1982. Items on the June 
and September tests were selected from the 
March, April, and May data collection pe- 
riods, thus creating l- to 3- and 4- to 6- 
month delay intervals, respectively. Items 
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on the December test were taken from the 
February, April, and May data collection 
periods yielding delays of 7, 8, and 10 
months. On the February test, 9-, 11- and 
12-month delay intervals were formed by 
choosing items from the February, March, 
and May data collection periods. The fifth 
test was not part of the original design but 
was given in mid-September 1983 as a 
follow-up to evaluate memory for autobio- 
graphical material after a further, extended 
delay. The records selected for this fifth test 
were drawn from February and March, 
1981; thus, the delay interval was 30-31 
months from when the memories were re- 
corded and tested. 
This design incorporates three important 
controls. First, all of the daily records were 
collected before testing began to ensure 
that future record keeping was not influ- 
enced by prior test knowledge. Second, 
items were selected for testing only once, 
to avoid the influence of repeated testing. 
Third, the items on each test were chosen 
so as to include records from a wide range 
of data collection periods. For example, the 
items used at each testing time were col- 
lected during three different periods. Our 
concern here was that the subjects might 
use specific temporal cues among items as 
a retrieval strategy to aid within-test dating 
performance. 
Subjects 
Six graduate student volunteers, four fe- 
males and two males, were paid for their 
participation. Attrition claimed one student 
during the first month of data collection 
who found daily record keeping too time 
consuming. Two students were excluded 
from the second and three from the fourth 
test since they did not keep sufficient num- 
bers of records. Three subjects completed 
the fifth test, the 2% year follow-up. 
Tasks and Materials 
One set of materials was used for data 
collection, another for testing. In data col- 
lection, the materials were 240 possible 
subject-generated daily records. Each 
day’s records were kept on a separate 4 x 
6 in. index card. Abbreviated instructions 
were included across the top of the card. 
Below the instructions was space for the 
subjects to write their records. The subjects 
were encouraged to use a simplified format 
for their episode record keeping that in- 
cluded three components: a context, a de- 
scription of the event itself, and a reaction 
to or evaluation of the event. This format 
was derived from the elements of story 
grammars (cf. Mandler & Johnson, 1977). 
No attempt was made to define compre- 
hensively the nature of everyday events; 
subjects defined for themselves what con- 
stituted the events they reported. 
The tasks and materials used for each of 
the first four times of testing included a 45- 
item, “Yes/No”-type recognition test and a 
12-item (six pairs) ordering and dating test. 
The 2% year post-test was similar except 18 
items were used for ordering and dating 
(nine pairs). 
Each 45-item test included 18 original 
records (six records from three data collec- 
tion periods) identical to those reported by 
the subjects. The remaining 27 items were 
foils. Three types of foils were used. Nine 
foil evaluations, three from each of three 
data collection periods, were rewritten 
from original records by changing the sub- 
jects’ reactions to or evaluations of events. 
Nine foil descriptions, again based on three 
records chosen from three data collection 
periods, were constructed by rewriting 
some aspect of the subjects’ description of 
the event itself. A simplified illustration 
would be if a subject had reported: 
Event: I went to lunch at a new restaurant. 
Original Description: The menu included a se- 
lection of deli sandwiches and fresh breads. 
Original Euahation: At last there is some variety 
in places to eat by my office. 
Foil Description: The waiter asked if I wanted 
coffee before ordering. 
Foil Evaluarion: It looks like just another me- 
diocre restaurant. 
Nine foil-other items were taken from the 
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records of a person not participating in the 
study but who lived in the same university 
environment. A ‘I-point confidence rating 
scale was associated with each Yes/No item 
(1 = Not confident, 7 = Very confident the 
response was correct). 
In developing the foil-evaluation items, 
we rewrote the evaluation of an event by 
(a) negating the actual reaction, and (b) fa- 
bricating an unlikely evaluative statement 
if the record lacked an evaluation. The foil- 
description items were manufactured by re- 
placing or revising the details or elabora- 
tions of the event with a semantically con- 
sistent description of the event. Two judges 
working together constructed the entire 
pool of foil items for each recognition test. 
Total agreement was reached on the appro- 
priateness of each foil before it was in- 
cluded on a test. A foil was judged appro- 
priate if it was a plausible change given the 
judges’ general knowledge of the person 
and a specific original record; thus, if a 
person was a known vegetarian, “ham- 
burger” would not be substituted for “bean 
salad.” It is noteworthy that we knew our 
subjects very well, allowing us to construct 
reasonable but still fundamentally altered 
foil items. It was not possible to have the 
subjects rate the plausibility of foils; how- 
ever, all of the foils from the first four tests 
were rated by independent judges. Judg- 
ments were made regarding the degree of 
semantic difference between foil-evalua- 
tion and foil-description items, and the 
original records from which they were 
written. 
The ordering and dating tasks for the first 
four tests consisted of six pairs (12 items) 
of original records. These originals were 
the same items as 12 of the 18 originals on 
the recognition test. The memories in each 
pair were selected and matched to ensure 
that they were recorded at least 1 month 
apart. Located to the right of each ordered 
pair was a 7-point confidence rating scale 
(1 = Not confident, 7 = Very confident 
that the records were ordered correctly in 
time). On the 2]/2 year post-test, nine pairs 
(18 items) of original records were matched 
without regard for the delay interval be- 
tween recording times because these items 
were selected from two adjacent data col- 
lection periods. This change in the con- 
struction of the fifth test was mandated by 
the limited number of items remaining from 
certain data collection periods. 
Procedures 
Data collection. The subjects were con- 
tacted individually and told that this was a 
study of their memory for everyday life 
events. They were informed that we were 
interested in the content of daily events 
self-selected as memorable, and with long- 
term memory for everyday happenings. In 
a set of general instructions, the subjects 
were asked to keep careful records of at 
least three memorable events a day, 5 days 
a week (Monday-Friday). These records 
were collected every Monday for the pre- 
vious week and this arrangement continued 
for 4 months. 
Specific record-keeping instructions 
were given to each subject. The essential 
features of these instructions were that on 
Monday of each week, the subject was to 
take five cards and date them with the cor- 
responding day of the week it would be 
used. When recording events, subjects 
were asked to keep the following in mind: 
(1) the content of the events was entirely 
up to them, and (2) each event record 
should probably contain at least three ele- 
ments-a context, an event, and a reac- 
tion. The subjects were encouraged but not 
required to use this format to ensure some 
uniformity in the records and to provide 
enough information so that appropriate foil 
items could be constructed. Subjects were 
told: 
Contexr refers to the environment in 
which the memorable event is placed. Con- 
text may be general (for example, “This 
morning while 1 was walking across 
campus. . . . “) or specific (for example, “I 
was on the second floor of the library at 
3:00 PM when. . . .” ). An event is some- 
thing that happens or a noteworthy hap- 
pening. That is, an event is the content of 
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what you think is memorable. Your reuc- 
tion to the event includes any internal, 
emotional response elicited by the event 
and any external, overt physical or verbal 
response you make. 
Note that subjects were instructed to re- 
cord events that were memorable or note- 
worthy. This certainly restricted the pool of 
possible events. We adopted this procedure 
for several reasons. One was our need to 
get records of the original events for later 
accuracy comparisons. Like Linton, we 
used subjects’ contemporary records of 
these events as our original data. So that 
these contemporary records would them- 
selves reflect the original events accurately 
we asked for records of memorable, note- 
worthy events. Two concerns are obvious 
with this procedure. First, it may inflate ac- 
curacy for original events. But notice our 
analysis strategy rests on comparing 
memory for foils and originals, not simply 
examining accuracy on originals alone. 
Second, it is not entirely clear that our sub- 
jects’ performance best reflects memory for 
events or for the records of those events. 
This ambiguity was necessary in order to 
collect a set of verifiable records against 
which to judge accuracy at all. 
Testing. Subjects were tested individu- 
ally. The recognition test was completed 
first, followed by the ordering and then 
dating tests. On the recognition test, sub- 
jects were instructed to positively identify 
only those items which were exact replicas 
of their original records, and then rate how 
confident they were that their answers were 
correct. 
Ordering involved the sequencing of two 
original events in time. The subjects were 
told to decide which event in a pair was 
most remote and which most recent. Once 
the items in a pair were ordered, the sub- 
jects rated how confident they were that the 
items were sequenced correctly. They then 
tried to give the exact date each event had 
occurred-the dating test. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In the data collection periods, the 
t-3 4-6 7-9 IO-12 
MONTH INTERVAL 
FIG. 1. Hit and false alarm rates as a function of 
month interval. 
missing data rate for the five subjects com- 
pleting the first test was .17 (range = .05- 
.49). That is, of the 240 possible records, 
on the average 199 were in fact collected. 
The findings of primary interest include 
first, recognition performance, then or- 
dering and dating accuracy. Figure 1 de- 
picts the “hits” and “false alarms” for 
items on the recognition tests. Foil items 
were scored as false alarms if the subject 
responded “Yes” thereby falsely identi- 
fying a foil as an original. These data were 
collapsed across subjects and blocked into 
four, 3-month intervals to emphasize the 
performance trends. The hit rate was higher 
than the false alarm rate at every month 
interval (smallest mean difference, t(31) = 
32.74, p < .OOl).’ In Figure 2, the propor- 
tion of items correctly recognized is plotted 
separately for various foil types; the data 
on originals are included again for compar- 
ison. Accuracy on foil-other items was sig- 
nificantly less than that found for orig- 
inals (t(62) = 18.21, p < .OOl) but greater 
than for foil-evaluation and foil-description 
items at every delay interval (smallest mean 
difference, t(ll) = 2.77, p < .05). The 
overall mean for foil-other items was .76. 
’ These statistical tests are reported as rough esti- 
mates of Type I errors. Completely appropriate anal- 
yses are unavailable because of the limited number of 
subjects tested, the scores among item types were not 
independent, and repeated tests were given over delay 
intervals. The degrees of freedom reported represent 
number of data points in the analyses. 




FIG. 2. Recognition accuracy as a function of month 
interval and item type. 
These data show an accurate discrimi- 
nation between original and foil memories, 
but also suggest a positive response bias. 
Thus, hits and false alarms significantly 
differ, but foils are often accepted as one’s 
own. A signal detection analysis confirmed 
this impression. Our data, because of the 
small number of subjects, do not strictly 
conform to the statistical assumptions re- 
quired for signal detection analysis. Nev- 
ertheless, estimates of sensitivity (A’) or 
true ability to discriminate original items 
from foils, and response bias @“)-corn- 
puted using nonparametric signal detection 
measures (Grier, 1971)-corroborate the 
above findings. Based on scores summed 
across the first year delay intervals for orig- 
inal, foil-evaluation, and foil-description 
items, A’ (sensitivity) = .84 and B” (re- 
sponse bias) = - .61 (d’ averaged 1.78). 
These results indicate a high degree of dis- 
criminability but one coupled with a bias 
toward identifying recognition test items as 
original records. 
Because of the small number of measure- 
ment points, the data cannot support signal 
detection analyses at the different delay in- 
tervals. Nonetheless, it is clear from Fig- 
ures 1 and 2 that accuracy declined with 
time: correct acceptance of original records 
stayed quite high, but false alarms in- 
creased. Specifically, the rate of false 
alarms increased from .37 at the I- to 3- 
month interval to .52 at lo- 12 months, t(56) 
= - 8.35, p < .OOl. The largest change be- 
tween adjacent intervals was from .37 to .45 
for intervals l-3 versus 4-6, respectively, 
$61) = -6.15, p < .OOl. Conversely, the 
correct rejection of foils decreased with 
time, and it did so for each of the foil 
types-foil other, foil evaluation and foil 
description (comparing l- to 3- vs lo- to 12- 
month delays, the smallest mean difference 
across the three types yielded, t(23) = 7.34, 
p < .OOl). Subjects thus got worse at re- 
jecting foil items with increasing delay. This 
was true even for foil-other items; subjects 
could usually, but by no means always, cor- 
rectly reject the memories of someone else 
who was also engaged in familiar kinds of 
daily activities associated with college life. 
The means for foil-other items varied 
widely across time, with a range of .84 at 
l-3 months and .59 at lo-12 months. This 
variation was probably due to differences 
in the specific nature of the foil-other items, 
i.e., the inclusion of varying numbers of 
distinctive events that were impossible as 
one’s own. In line with this, variance 
across subjects was greater for foil-other 
items then for originals, foil-evaluations, or 
foil-descriptions at every delay except for 
the 7- to 9-month interval. 
At the 2!&year test, 79% of the original 
records were identified accurately (hits). 
This compares with 95% at the l-year test. 
At the same time, 74% of the foil items 
were correctly rejected. This high level of 
performance is clarified by examining the 
percentage of foil-evaluation, foil-descrip- 
tion, and foil-other items correctly recog- 
nized; the means were 52, 48, and 96%. re- 
spectively. Two subjects were 100% correct 
in rejecting the foil-other items at the 2!L- 
year post-test. Again, these particular foils 
were apparently so dissimilar from originals 
that they were easily identified as distrac- 
tors. Excluding the foil-other items, the 
correct rejections of foil-evaluation and 
foil-description items did not differ from 
each other and were comparable to the 
rates reported in the l-year data. 
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TABLE 1 
MEAN CONFIDENCE RATINGS OVER DELAY INTERVAL 
BY ITEM TYPE FOR CORRECT, MISSES, AND 
FALSE ALARM RESPONSES 
Months delay 
Item type 1-3 4-6 7-9 10-12 
Original 
Correct 5.76 5.89 5.76 5.92 
Misses 4.89 6.33 5.75 5.25 
Foil evaluation 
Correct 4.52 5.23 5.63 4.92 
False alarms 4.39 4.59 5.29 5.21 
Foil description 
Correct 3.00 5.69 4.48 5.53 
False alarms 5.85 5.00 5.75 4.67 
Foil other 
Correct 5.12 5.95 5.90 5.37 
False alarms 5.08 4.58 2.75 3.76 
Nore. Maximum possible score = 7 (Very confi- 
dent). 
Inspection of the subject’s confidence 
ratings (Table 1) for the first four delay in- 
tervals shows that overall, the ratings were 
only slightly higher for correct responses 
than for misses (i.e., saying “No” to orig- 
inal records) and false alarms. Most impor- 
tantly, the ratings were relatively stable 
with increasing delay intervals. The only 
apparent decline in contidence was for false 
alarm responses on foil-other items. On the 
26year post-test, the mean confidence rat- 
ings for hits and false alarms were 5.28 and 
5.21, respectively. In comparison to de- 
creasing accuracy (Figures 1, 2, & long- 
term post-test), the subjects remained fairly 
confident in their choices. 
These findings show that recognition 
memory for autobiographical events is both 
strikingly accurate and inaccurate, when 
viewed from two different perspectives. 
Autobiographical memory is accurate in the 
special sense that people can correctly 
identify a great number of everyday events 
that actually occurred even after consider- 
able periods of time. Indeed, if given an ac- 
tual record from their past (as done here 
and by Linton), people are quite accurate 
at recognizing it as theirs. Accuracy of this 
sort is intuitively consistent with many of 
our everyday recollections; we feel that 
those memories retrieved as “our life 
events” really happened as remembered. 
Our data support this intuition in that per- 
formance on original records was quite high 
overall and confidence in one’s recognition 
of these items was also high and relatively 
stable across long time intervals. Thus, 
from the perspective of subjects’ everyday 
experience, which focuses primarily on the 
correct acceptance of original memories, 
autobiographical memory is strikingly ac- 
curate. 
However, from an experimental perspec- 
tive, evaluation of memory accuracy 
cannot be based on data from original rec- 
ords alone; it requires the joint consider- 
ation of recognition performance on foil as 
well as original items. In fact, based on 
comparing both sorts of performances, au- 
tobiographical memory is accurate in that 
hits outweigh false alarms, but also clearly 
inaccurate because there is a strong bias 
toward identifying foil items as actual mem- 
ories. Stated differently, if autobiographical 
memories were accurate in the sense of di- 
rect access to some stored memory trace 
we should have found few false recogni- 
tions of foils, as well as the reported high 
rate of correct responses to original rec- 
ords. Since the false alarm rate was so high, 
it is improbable that autobiographical 
memory is accurate in this sense. Note fur- 
ther that our subjects even had some diffi- 
culty identifying someone else’s life events 
as not their own; the rejection of foil-other 
items never reached the same level of ac- 
curacy as the correct acceptance of origi- 
nals. 
The levels of false alarms in the present 
data are even more revealing of inaccuracy 
in everyday, autobiographical memories, 
given the fact that our subjects both knew 
at the time original records were collected 
that they would be tested on reported 
events and were instructed to record only 
reasonably “memorable” daily happenings 
(see also Thompson, 1982). These proce- 
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FIG. 3. Dating (a) and ordering (b) accuracy as a 
function of month interval. 
dures should have served to increase rec- 
ognition accuracy and may indeed be partly 
responsible for the high hit rate data. How- 
ever, in spite of these procedures, it is still 
clear that memory for everyday autobio- 
graphical events is biased and inaccurate in 
the sense that people tend to incorrectly 
identify nonevents as being from their past. 
This picture of accuracies and inaccura- 
cies in recognition of autobiographical in- 
formation also fits the results from the tem- 
poral ordering and dating tests. The pro- 
portion of item pairs correctly ordered 
(earlier versus later) when the two items 
represented delays of 1 month versus 3, 4 
months versus 6, 8 months versus 10 and 9 
months versus 11 were .73, .96, .67, and 
.72, respectively. Accuracy over all these 
tests of a 2-month comparison as above .50 
and averaged .77 (smallest mean differ- 
ence, t(l5) = 5.67,~ < .OOl). 
Figure 3 presents the data on dating ac- 
curacy. Panel (a) shows the proportion of 
memories forgotten, that is, not dated or 
dated only in some broad time frame, for 
example, the season of the year the episode 
was recorded. These proportions are siz- 
able, ranging from about .40 at the l- to 3- 
month interval to over .80 at lo- 12 months, 
and it is apparent that recall becomes more 
difficult with time. It can be seen in panel 
(b) that of the memories dated (60-20% as 
explained above), the absolute dating error 
increased from approximately 9 to 22 days 
in 12 months. This indicated that even if a 
record was dated, memory for the month 
and day the episode occurred declined as 
the memory became more remote.* These 
data are consistent with comparable results 
reported by Baddeley, Lewis, and Nimmo- 
Smith (1978), Linton (1975). and Thompson 
(1982). 
While ordering events separated by at 
least 1 month was reasonably accurate, 
dating the records, which required that the 
subjects recollect precise information about 
when some event occurred, was much more 
inaccurate. It is thus unlikely that memo- 
ries of everyday life events are represented 
in a form isomorphic with the way in which 
they truly happened, including temporal 
and spatial features. Clearly many autobio- 
graphical memories are not strictly episodic 
in nature (Tulving, 1972). 
Our findings, especially the particular 
mix of accuracy and inaccuracy uncovered, 
are conducive to thinking of autobiograph- 
ical memories in schema-like terms. Al- 
though the data are consistent with other 
memory models (cf. Johnson & Raye, 
1981), a schema view of autobiographical 
memory is appealing since everyday rec- 
ollections may be integrated into personal 
knowledge structures that give meaning to 
seemingly isolated everyday occurrences. 
People know in general the sorts of events 
that have occurred in their life, even though 
most past episodes cannot be reproduced 
from memory in complete detail. Further, 
the term autobiography itself suggests a 
story-like schema. Similar to other story 
schemas, this schema would regulate the 
? The ordering results from the long-term post-test 
indicated a modest decline in the accuracy of ordering 
two events from I (X = .74 for tests l-4) to 2% years 
(X = .67). This decrease probably reflects ordering 
errors attributable to the nearness of events separated 
in time of occurrence by less than a month in the latter 
but not the former tests. The dating test from the long- 
term follow-up showed that the absolute error in days 
for the records dated was 22.41 (range = 6-67) days. 
Thus, there was little increase in error for locating 
events precisely in time after about a year. This con- 
clusion must be considered relative to the limited time 
span from which the events were selected and the fact 
that our subjects were no longer keeping daily records 
when tested. 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY 101 
encoding and retrieval of related material 
(cf. Alba & Hasher, 1983; Bower, Black, & 
Turner, 1979; Graesser, 1981; Spiro, 1977). 
While there is much change from day to day 
in most everyone’s life and associated 
events and activities, there is also a corre- 
sponding invariance in one’s sense or gist 
of their life. Here, gist at the most general 
level is, we believe, one’s autobiography- 
the schematized story of one’s life. What 
one remembers then is, at least in part, 
what could have happened or should have 
happened in one’s life. People also, in part, 
remember actual past events and success- 
fully monitor reality (Johnson & Raye, 
1981; Neisser, 1976). Thus. as an autobiog- 
raphy, this sense of your life is also individ- 
ualized and specialized according to the 
content and interpretation of your life 
events. From this point of view, the accu- 
racy and inaccuracy of everyday memories 
as reported here is intimately related to re- 
ports that information consistent with one’s 
prototypic self-concept is remembered 
more accurately than inconsistent infor- 
mation (Markus & Sentis, 1980; Rogers, 
1980). 
In line with an autobiography-schema in- 
terpretation of autobiographical memories, 
it is significant that comparing the accuracy 
versus confidence rating data from both the 
l-year and long-term follow-up shows that 
while recognition performance declines 
over time, perceived certainty remains 
fairly stable. People are more confident 
about the exact nature of events occurring 
in their life than they should be. We believe 
that people claim confidence in autobio- 
graphical information, both in tests such as 
these and in simply recounting life events, 
because the events could have happened in 
“their life” and the gist of one’s life re- 
mains fairly constant over a reasonable pe- 
riod of time. A stable perception of one’s 
autobiography engenders a stable estima- 
tion of confidence in spite of the fact that 
memories become less accurate. At 
bottom, we hypothesize that the same au- 
tobiographical schemata account for the 
correct recognition of actual autobiograph- 
ical memories, the false recognition of cer- 
tain nonevents as one’s own memories, the 
accurate rejection of other nonevents, and 
an overcontidence in the “facts” of one’s 
life. 
Any strict test of this account of autobio- 
graphical memory is beyond the scope of 
our data; however, we can provide some 
further evidence consistent with it. We rea- 
soned that people would falsely identify a 
foil item if it was typical of some abstracted 
representation of their own life events. If 
so, the probability of making a false alarm 
response should covary with the degree to 
which a foil item was similar or discrepant 
in general meaning, though not specific de- 
tail, to the original from which it was 
written. Degree of discrepancy between 
originals and foils is a subjective evaluation 
based on an assessment of whether or not 
the foil specifies essentially the same sort 
of experience conveyed in the original re- 
cord. All of the foil-evaluation and foil-de- 
scription items were paired with their re- 
spective original records. A total of 288 
pairs were then judged by eight indepen- 
dent raters. Each pair was rated on a 7- 
point scale for the degree of “semantic dis- 
crepancy” between the foil and its original 
(1 = Not semantically different, 7 = Very 
semantically different). Semantic difference 
was explained to the raters as the extent to 
which the foil varied in truth value or 
meaning from the original. These ratings 
were averaged over judges for each subject 
and separated by item type. Point-biserial 
correlations were calculated between the 
mean ratings and the response outcomes (1 
= “correct”, 0 = “false alarm”). 
All the correlations were positive; the 
mean coefficient for foil-evaluation items 
was .51, for foil descriptions, .66. The 
greater the raters’ estimated degree of se- 
mantic distance between foils and originals, 
the more likely the subjects were to cor- 
rectly reject the foils as not their own mem- 
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ories. Similarly for both foil-evaluation and 
foil-description items the average semantic 
difference rating for false alarms (3.82 and 
2.88. respectively) was less than that re- 
ported for correct rejections (4.39 and 3.65, 
respectively). On the one hand, these item 
analyses could have provided evidence 
against a schema-like account, but they did 
not; on the other hand, they are consistent 
with several interpretations, not only the 
one outlined here. 
The view that autobiographical memory 
is largely the schematized reconstruction of 
previous life events is not new (e.g., Bart- 
lett, 1932; Freud, 1914/1960). Our contri- 
bution to this claim is the evidence re- 
garding the implicated inaccuracies that 
should occur in many autobiographical rec- 
ollections from this perspective. Specifi- 
cally, autobiographical memory ought to be 
inaccurate in certain predictable respects, 
and even ought to be generally inaccurate 
when considered in the context of what 
really happened or could have occurred. A 
critical estimate of accuracy in autobio- 
graphical memory has been difficult to 
achieve because the existing research find- 
ings are fragmentary: few studies have ad- 
dressed this issue because of the difficulty 
collecting information about original 
events. Further, in those studies that have 
information about original events, memory 
tests appropriate to a comprehensive eval- 
uation of accuracy have not been em- 
ployed. Our study, in spite of its acknowl- 
edged limitations, approximates more 
closely than others conditions necessary 
for examining accuracy in autobiographical 
memory. Thus, it paints a needed, more 
balanced picture, capturing both the ap- 
parent accuracy of many autobiographical 
memories coupled with real inaccuracies 
and biases. 
From our data it is clear that considering 
memory performance on original items 
alone, without comparison to foils, is mis- 
leading because people tend to inaccurately 
accept nonevents which are consistently re- 
lated to actual happenings. Neisser’s (1981) 
description of “repisodic” memory-re- 
membering a supposed event but one in 
which the exact details are blended over re- 
peatedly occurring and related episodes- 
would be one instance of this more general 
phenomenon. Therefore, memory func- 
tions of this sort showing little forgetting for 
personal, episodic events over long periods 
of time overestimate the amount of infor- 
mation accurately remembered (Linton, 
1975, 1979, 1982). 
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